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A GAME THEORY VIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE U.S., CHINA AND TAIWAN 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Taiwan Strait issue has been a major concern for those interested in the 
foreign policy of the United States. For quite some time, the peaceful solution to the 
Taiwan Strait issue has been a joint objective of the U.S., China and Taiwan. In 1962, 
the Cuban Missile Crisis between the Soviet Union and the U.S. almost brought about 
a destructive nuclear war. However, the U.S. applied a brinkmanship strategy that 
ended the crisis peacefully. Brinkmanship is one of the more interesting applications 
of game theory. I will apply game theory and analyze possible results of a 
brinkmanship strategy in the context of the present Taiwan Strait situation. I will use 
this idea and other examples to illustrate how game theory might be applied to 








TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
II. BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................................3 
A. THE HISTORY OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT ISSUE .................................3 
B.  THE PRC’S STANDPOINT ...........................................................................4 
C. TAIWAN’S STANDPOINT............................................................................4 
D. THE U.S. STANDPOINT................................................................................6 
E. JAPAN’S STANDPOINT................................................................................7 
F. MILITARY POWER COMPARISON..........................................................7 
III. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................11 
A. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................11 
B. GAME THEORY...........................................................................................12 
C. BRINKMANSHIP..........................................................................................12 
D. STAG HUNT ..................................................................................................16 
IV. ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................19 
A. PAYOFFS OF THE GAME IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.........................19 
1. Payoff Relations in the Taiwan Strait ..............................................19 
2. Payoff with Attacking Probabilities Relations in the Taiwan 
Strait....................................................................................................20 
3. An Extensive Form Approach to Potential Payoffs in the 
Taiwan Strait......................................................................................23 
B. THE PROBABILITY OF U.S. INTERVENTION .....................................25 
C. THE SCENARIO IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT ....................27 
D. BRINKMANSHIP IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT...................29 
E.  STAG HUNT GAME IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT....................................33 
F. FUTURE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT ISSUE...........................................34 
1. Taiwan Presidential Election in 2008...............................................34 
2. Democratization in China .................................................................35 
3. The U.S. Presidential Election in 2008 .............................................36 
G.   BRINKMANSHIP OR STAG HUNT IN THE FUTURE..........................37 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................39 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................43 













LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in Taiwan.........................................5 
Figure 2. Public Opinion on Beijing’s Hostility toward ROC in Taiwan .........................6 
Figure 3. Payoff Matrix of Stag Hunt Game ...................................................................17 
Figure 4. Payoff Matrix of Cross-Strait Relations ..........................................................20 
Figure 5. Payoff Matrix Combined with Attacking Probabilities in Cross-Strait 
Relations ..........................................................................................................23 
Figure 6. Assumed Payoff Matrix of Cross-Strait Relations...........................................24 
Figure 7. Assumed Payoff Combined with Attacking Probabilities in 
Cross-Strait Relations ......................................................................................25 
Figure 8. Scenario in the Taiwan Strait in extensive form when the U.S. has 
“strategic transparency” policy. .......................................................................28 
Figure 9. Scenario in the Taiwan Strait in extensive form when the U.S. has 
“strategic ambiguity” policy. ...........................................................................28 
Figure 10. Scenario in the Taiwan Strait in extensive form after the U.S. 
intervention ......................................................................................................30 
Figure 11. The most likely outcomes in the Taiwan Strait issue after the U.S. 
intervention (The numbers are related to those in Figure 9)............................31 
Figure 12. Assumed Payoff Matrix for the Stag Hunt Game between Taiwan and 
China ................................................................................................................33 









LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Military Power Comparison of PRC, ROC and U.S..........................................9 
Table 2. Missile Forces of the PRC, 2006 .....................................................................10 
Table 3. Nuclear Power Comparison of US and PRC ...................................................10 
Table 4. Statistics of Top 5 of Value of Exports and Imports by Country in 
Taiwan..............................................................................................................12 












LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DPP   Democratic Progressive Party  
ICBM  Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
IISS   International Institute for Strategic Studies 
INF   Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
IRBM  Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile 
JFK   John F. Kennedy  
KMT  Kuomintang 
MRBM  Medium-Range Ballistic Missile  
NMD   National Missile Defense 
PRC   People’s Republic of China 
ROC  Republic of China 
SLBM  Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile 
SLCM  Sea-Launched Cruise Missile  
SRBM  Short-Range Ballistic Missile 
SSBN  Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine 
TRA  Taiwan Relations Act 
U.S.   United States  
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 













I would like to express my sincere thanks to my advisors, Dr. Raymond E. 
Franck and Dr. Francois Melese, and the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School for 
your insight, knowledge and direction. I would also like to thank my family in Taiwan 
for their support. Without all of your help and concern, this project would not have 









After the defeat of the KMT (Kuomintang) by the Communist Party of China 
in the Chinese civil war in 1949, the PRC (People’s Republic of China) was founded 
in Beijing by the Communist government, and the government of the ROC (Republic 
of China) was forced to retreat to Taipei. From then on, both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait entered into a protracted dispute. The PRC government claimed Taiwan was a 
renegade province and insisted Taiwan was an indivisible part of China.  
In Taiwan, advocates exist for three separate options: keeping the status quo, 
declaring Taiwan’s independence, and promoting reunification with mainland China. 
The PRC has never renounced the possible use of force in resolving the Taiwan Strait 
issue. Meanwhile, the United States recognizes only one China and considers the PRC 
the sole legitimate government of China.1 However, based on the Taiwan Relations 
Act (TRA), the U.S. is committed to “resist any resort to force or other forms of 
coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the 
people on Taiwan.”2 Furthermore, although the U.S. opposes Taiwan’s independence, 
it preserves the option of intervening in the Taiwan Strait conflict should there be an 
invasion by the mainland.3 
Despite longstanding tension in the Taiwan Strait, a peaceful solution has been 
declared the joint objective of the U.S., China and Taiwan.4 In this study, I will use 
game theory to analyze possible results of different strategies among Taiwan, the U.S. 
and China given the present situation in the Taiwan Strait. One of the more interesting 
applications of game theory involves brinkmanship. In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis 
between the Soviet Union and the U.S. almost brought about a destructive nuclear war. 
However, a “brinkmanship” strategy by the U.S. ultimately resulted in the crisis 
                                                 
1 Bush: US supports 'one-China' policy, China Daily News, November 16, 2005, available at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-11/16/content_495224.htm (last accessed March 
2007). 
2 SEC. 2 (b)-(6), Taiwan Relations Act, 1979. 
3 Brett V. Benson and Emerson M. S. Niou, Comprehending Strategic Ambiguity: U.S. Security 
Commitment to Taiwan, available at: http://www.duke.edu/~niou/teaching/strategic%20ambiguity.pdf 
(last accessed April 2007). 
4 Questions and Answers on the Taiwan status, April 28, 2003, available at: 




ending peacefully. I will use this idea and other game theory approaches to illustrate 
the possible contribution of game theory applications to the peaceful resolution of the 
Taiwan Strait issue. 
The main research questions that will be explored are: (1) Under what 
conditions would mainland China be likely to attempt a military conquest of Taiwan? 
(2) Under what conditions would the U.S. (and its allies) be likely to intervene in the 
Taiwan Strait conflict? (3) What is the likely result of a mainland Chinese invasion of 
Taiwan? What factors would help explain the outcome? (4) What are some avenues to 
a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait issue? 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Chapter II reviews the 
background of the Taiwan Strait issue. Chapter III introduces the game theoretic 
methodology, which will be applied in this study. Chapter IV analyzes the results of 
using game theory methods to understand the Taiwan Strait issue. Chapter V 
concludes this thesis and offers policy recommendations for the future management of 





A. THE HISTORY OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT ISSUE 
The Taiwan Strait issue has been a major concern for those interested in 
foreign policy in the U.S., since the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949 when China 
was divided in two. The PRC controls the mainland, and the ROC rules Taiwan. In 
1950, the U.S. Seventh Fleet was sent to the Taiwan Strait to end any immediate 
possibility of invasion of Taiwan by mainland China. This was the first time the U.S. 
helped defend Taiwan. Later, in the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-55 and 1958, the U.S. 
supplied ammunition to support Taiwan.5 In 1971, the ROC was replaced by the PRC 
as the sole representative of China recognized in the United Nations. In 1979, the U.S. 
established formal diplomatic relationships with the PRC and broke off formal 
relations with the ROC. In the same year, the U.S. and Taiwan drew up the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA), which is the only formal document stating a U.S. commitment 
to protect Taiwan from attack by mainland China. All arms procurement agreements 
between the U.S. and Taiwan are based upon this Act.  
In the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96, the PRC conducted a series of missile 
tests in the waters surrounding Taiwan. The intention was to send a message to the 
Taiwanese electorate that voting for Lee Teng-hui in the first direct Taiwanese 
Presidential election risked a war with the PRC. The aircraft carrier USS Nimitz 
passed through the Taiwan Strait in 1995 as a signal of support for peaceful relations 
in the Taiwan Strait, and two other carriers followed in 1996.6 This was the first time 
U.S. warships had passed through the Taiwan Strait since the U.S. broke formal 
relations with Taiwan. Whether or not the PRC ended its military exercises as a result 
of U.S. actions, the U.S. nevertheless sent a very strong signal to the PRC regarding 
any possible invasion of Taiwan.  
                                                 
5 First Taiwan Strait Crisis, Wikipedia, available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Taiwan_Strait_Crisis (last accessed April 2007) and Second Taiwan 
Strait Crisis, Wikipedia, available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Taiwan_Strait_Crisis (last 
accessed April 2007). 
6 Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, Wikipedia, available at: 




B.  THE PRC’S STANDPOINT 
In recent years, the PRC has not stopped threatening Taiwan with armed force. 
In February 2000, China published a White Paper7 which asserted that China will 
never renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Strait. China threatens to use force 
against Taiwan under the following four conditions: 
1.  If Taiwan declares independence.  
2.  If Taiwan is invaded or occupied by a foreign country. 
3.  If Taiwan develops nuclear weapons.  
4.  If Taiwan refuses peaceful reunification through negotiations (which 
have been postponed indefinitely).8 
In March 2005, the “Anti-Separation Law” was passed by the third conference 
of the 10th National People’s Congress of the PRC. This law formalized the PRC’s 
longstanding policy of using military force against Taiwan. According to a recent 
Pentagon report, China has more than 700 ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan.9 
Moreover, China has increased its military budget rapidly in recent years in a bid to 
replace the U.S. as the preeminent power in the Far East.  
C. TAIWAN’S STANDPOINT 
In Taiwan, there are two main political coalitions: The Pan-Blue Coalition and 
the Pan-Green Coalition. The Pan-Blue Coalition is led by the KMT (Kuomintang) 
and asserts that the ROC is not part of the PRC, and adheres to the “one China” 
principle. This means the ROC is the only China and this is the basis for political 
communication with the PRC. In contrast, the Pan-Green Coalition, which mainly 
consists of the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), argues that Taiwan and China are 
two different countries and that the people of Taiwan have the right to decide their 
own future. The DPP won the 2000 and 2004 Taiwanese Presidential elections, 
causing some tense relations between China and Taiwan. This may have influenced 
the passage of the “Anti-Separation Law” in mainland China. Nowadays, the political 
                                                 
7 Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of 
China, “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” February 21, 2000, available at: 
http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/White-Paper-022100.htm (last accessed April 2007). 
8 Political status of Taiwan, Wikipedia, available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_status_of_Taiwan (last accessed April 2007). 
9 Political status of Taiwan, Wikipedia, available at: 




circles in Taiwan still argue over the issue of “independence or reunification.” 
However, according to a public opinion survey of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council 
as seen in Figure 1,10 nearly forty percent of Taiwanese are in favor of keeping the 
status quo and postponing the decision; approximately twenty percent of them want to 
keep the status quo indefinitely; only two percent of Taiwanese prefer to unify with 
China as soon as possibly, and only six percent would rather choose independence as 
soon as possibly. Most Taiwanese still feel the PRC’s hostility toward Taiwan. As 
seen in Figure 2,11 about sixty percent of Taiwanese think the PRC government is 
hostile to the ROC government, and more than forty percent think it is hostile to 
Taiwanese people. This could make it very difficult to achieve the immediate 
reunification, which the PRC insists upon. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in Taiwan 
 
                                                 
10 Mainland Affairs Council, Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China, 
available at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/index1-e.htm (last accessed April 2007). 
11 Mainland Affairs Council, Public Opinion on Beijing’s Hostility toward ROC, available at: 





Figure 2.   Public Opinion on Beijing’s Hostility toward ROC in Taiwan 
 
D. THE U.S. STANDPOINT 
There are currently two different opinions regarding Taiwan’s strategy in the 
U.S.12 The first is “strategic transparence,” that is, to tell Taiwan and China clearly 
that if mainland China invades Taiwan without any provocation, the U.S. will come to 
its defense. However, if military action by the PRC was provoked by Taiwan’s 
actions, then the U.S. would refrain from assisting Taiwan.  
The second alternative U.S. strategy is “strategic ambiguity.” In other words, 
the U.S. would maintain an enigmatic attitude that leaves both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait uncertain about U.S. actions. There is some belief this attitude could deter rash 
actions by both sides.13 
However, as China increases its military threat to Taiwan, the U.S. has 
responded by increasing arms sales to Taiwan. According to the TRA, the U.S. can 
only offer defensive weapons to Taiwan. This causes tense relationships between the 
U.S. and China. This vicious circle was repeated in recent years. However, a recent 10 
billion dollar arms procurement sale from the U.S. has been repeatedly vetoed by 
                                                 
12 Rebecca Jimerson, Lawrence Cooper and Corinne Contant, US Policy Considerations – China, 
Taiwan, and the Pacific Rim, available at: http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/spacemilch3.htm (last accessed 
April 2007). 
13 Pan Zhongqi, The Dilemma of Deterrence: US Strategic Ambiguity Policy and its Implications 
for the Taiwan Strait, p. 11, April 2001, available at: 




opposition parties in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan.14 Some U.S. political critics have 
begun to doubt whether Taiwan has the ability to defend itself against an attack from 
China.15 
E. JAPAN’S STANDPOINT 
Japan is a major power in the Far East and one of the most important allies of 
the U.S., therefore Japan’s attitude is critical to the Taiwan Strait situation. The 
Taiwan Strait is one of the most important sea-lanes for Japan. Japan, like the U.S., 
recognizes the PRC as the sole representative of China. However, in 1996 the U.S. 
and Japan signed a joint declaration called the “U.S.--Japan Joint Declaration on 
Security--Alliance for the 21st Century.” This declaration promised a wider security 
role for Japan and restructured its relationship with the U.S. in dealing with the new 
realities of the Western Pacific region. In this statement, the U.S. and Japan 
announced “they would encourage a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue through 
dialogue,” and, “made it their common strategic objective.”16 This is the first time 
that the U.S. and Japan have raised the Taiwan Strait issue to the level of a joint 
strategy. Meanwhile, the PRC strongly protested this announcement as interference in 
its internal affairs.17 
F. MILITARY POWER COMPARISON 
According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) report “Military Power 
of the People’s Republic of China in 2006,”18 Taiwan is perceived as China’s 
primary military target. Over one third of the PRC’s military power is deployed in the 
area of the Taiwan Strait. In earlier comparisons of the military power of China and 
                                                 
14 Taiwanese News, April 11, 2006, available at: 
http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/6/4/11/n1283814.htm (last accessed April 2007). 
15 Taiwanese News, December 28, 2006, available at: 
http://tw.bbs.yahoo.com/cgi-bin/ListFrame.cgi?board=weapon&query=%5B%B7s%BBD%5D%A4%
A3%ADx%C1%CA%B4N%B5%A5%A6%BA+Buy+or+Die%3F&rf=search&exact=1 (last accessed 
April 2007). 
16 Japan - U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1996, available at: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html (last accessed April 2007). 
17 China Daily News, February 22, 2005, available at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/22/content_418250.htm (last accessed April 2007). 
18 U.S. DOD’s Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2006, available at: 




Taiwan, it was believed that Taiwan had superior quality, while China had superior 
quantity. However, because of recent PRC investments in military modernization, 
Taiwan’s quality advantage has been seriously eroded.  
China has raised its military budget very quickly in recent years, partly as a 
result of its rapid economic growth. The PRC defense budget in 2005-06 grew by 
20% while that of Taiwan fell by 3% (see Table 1). According to the IISS 
(International Institute for Strategic Studies), the mainland’s 2007 defense budget is 
about 35 billion U.S. dollars. However, the U.S. DoD believes this number may be 
multiplied by 3, to around 100 billion.19 At its current high rate of growth, the 
Chinese defense budget would match the U.S. defense budget by 2023.  
Table 120 presents the static counts for the military power of the PRC, ROC 
and U.S. in 2006. We can see that there is a dramatic imbalance of weapons between 
the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. This U.S. report suggests Taiwan is experiencing a 
relative weakening in its self-defense capability. However, a recent 10 billion dollar 
U.S. arms procurement offer was vetoed by the opposition parties in Taiwan, which 
could lead to further imbalance in the future. According to this same annual report, 
China had 250 to 296 launchers with 793 to 916 missiles of seven types including 
approximately 105 armed with nuclear warheads (see Table 221).  
In the PRC’s 2004 Defense White Paper, China declared that its nuclear strike 
forces have two missions: deterrence of a nuclear attack, and nuclear retaliation. 
China has consistently stated its adherence to a “no first use” nuclear doctrine.22 
However, China is currently capable of targeting its nuclear forces at most regions of 
the world, including the continental United States.23 Although China still has a big 
                                                 
19 Defense News, March 6, 2007, available at: 
http://defensenews.com/story.php?F=2602009&C=asiapac (last accessed April 2007). 
20 The Military Balance 2007, IISS, London: Oxford University Press. 
21 WMD around the World, www.fas.org, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/nuke/index.html 
(last accessed June 2007. 
22 Annual Report to Congress--Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006, available 
at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2006/Gunnesspaper.pdf (last accessed May 2007). 
23 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Missile Forces, 




gap compared with the nuclear arms of the U.S. (see Table 324), its nuclear force is 
sufficient to cause a destructive nuclear war. That is why China is considered a 
potential threat to the U.S. by the National Missile Defense (NMD) program.25 
 
Category PRC ROC US 
National(2006) 
Population 1313M 23M 300M 
GDP $2620B $351B $13200B 
Defense budget $35.3B $7.73B $535B 
Growth rate in 
defense budget 
19.7% -3.0% 8.1% 
Armed forced personnel 
Active  2255K 290K 1507K 
Reserve 800K 1657K 974K 
Land forces 
Main battle tank 7580 926 7620 
Armored personnel 
carrier 
3500 950 16008 
Artillery 17700 1815 6530 
Naval forces 
Submarines 58 4 68 
Principal surface 
combatant 
76 33 106 
Patrol and coastal 
combatant 
242 71 16 
Aircraft carrier 0 0 12 
Mine warfare 65 12 24 
Amphibious  233 308 369 
Logistics and 
support 
163 18 238 
Air forces (in Air force) 
Aircraft 2643 479 2658 
Missile 4500 No information 41120 
Tanker 10 0 589 
Helicopter 80 35 205 
Table 1.   Military Power Comparison of PRC, ROC and U.S.  
 
                                                 
24 WMD around the World, www.fas.org, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/summary.htm, Data 
from March 2006 (last accessed June 2007). 
25 National Missile Defense, Background, Federation of American Scientists, available at: 




Inventory Launcher Missiles Estimated Range 
DF-5/CSS-4 ICBM  20 20 8,460+ km  
DF-4/CSS-3 ICBM  10-14 20-24 5,470+ km  
DF-3/CSS-2 IRBM  6-10 14-18 2,790+ km  
DF-21/CSS-5 MRBM 
Mod 1/2  
34-38 19-50 1,770+ km  
JL-1 SLBM  10-14 10-14 1,770+ km  
DF-15/CSS-6 SRBM  70-80 275-315 600 km  
DF-11/CSS-7 SRBM  100-120 435-475 300 km  
JL-2 SLBM Developmental   8,000+ km 
DF-31 ICBM Developmental  7,250+ km  
DF-31A ICBM  Developmental  11,270+ km  
Total 250-296 793-916  
Table 2.   Missile Forces of the PRC, 2006  
Category US PRC 
Stockpile 9,962 200 Weapons 
Deliverable 5,735 145 
Number 500 20 
Warheads 1,050 20 
ICBM 
Type 
MM II : 0 
MM III: 500 
MX PK: 0 
DF-5A: 20 
 
Number  73 




DF-4:   22 
DF-21: 35 
Number 336 12 
Warheads 2,016 12 
Type Trident-I:  0 Trident-II: 2,016 
JL-1: 12 
JL-2:  0 
SLBM 
SSBN Ohio: 14  
Number 115  
Warheads 1,955  Strategic Bombers 
Type B-2:   21 B-52: 94  
Number   
Warheads 500 40 
Theater Weapons 
Type 




Note: ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile; SRBM: Short-Range Ballistic Missile; IRBM: 
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile; MRBM: Medium-Range Ballistic Missile; SLBM: Sea-Launched 
Ballistic Missile; SSBN: Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine; SLCM: Sea-Launched Cruise 
Missile 
 






A pioneering paper entitled “A Game Theory View of Military Conflict in the 
Taiwan Strait” by Raymond E. Franck and Francois Melese applies game theory in 
the context of the Taiwan Strait. The objective of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait 
issue should be to find a win-win solution, not to continue playing a zero-sum or 
negative sum game. Therefore, it is important to investigate strategic moves between 
the PRC and Taiwan that could point the way towards a peaceful future, balancing 
military force with communication and commercial interests. 
In “The Strategy of Conflict,” Dr. Schelling explains: “The deterrence concept 
requires that there be both conflict and common interest between the parties involved; 
it is as inapplicable to a situation of pure and complete antagonism of interest as it is 
to the case of pure and complete common interest.”26 The present relationship 
between the U.S., China and Taiwan satisfies these conditions. Although the U.S. has 
recognized the “one China” policy, its policy is still constrained by the Taiwan 
Relations Act. Moreover, China and Taiwan are among the most important trading 
partners of the U.S. Even though current political relations between China and Taiwan 
might be considered hostile, China and Taiwan have cooperated very closely in 
business activities in recent years (see Table 427). Therefore, we know there are 
elements of both conflict and common interest among these three parties. On this 
basis game theory can be a useful tool to help understand the role of threats and 





                                                 
26 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, p. 11. 
27 Taiwan Bureau of Foreign Trade: http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/english/FSCE/FSC0011E.ASP (last 




TOTAL TRADE(re-imports & re-exports included) 
COUNTRY NAME 
RANKING AMOUNT SHARE (%) 
CHINA 1 76,590,504,462 17.949 
JAPAN 2 62,583,675,380 14.667 
UNITED STATES 3 55,024,582,918 12.895 
HONG KONG 4 39,261,330,306 9.201 
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF 5 22,153,550,709 5.192 
Table 4.   Statistics of Top 5 of Value of Exports and Imports by Country in 
Taiwan 
B. GAME THEORY  
Formal game theory was invented by John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern in 1944. It involves “the study of the ways in which strategic interactions 
among rational players produce outcomes with respect to the preferences (or utilities) 
of those players.”28 Game theory has been used extensively in analyzing psychology, 
philosophy, sociology, politics, economics, and so on. In addition, game theory is 
used to study international relations, especially the balance of power between 
antagonistic countries. Professor Schelling has a penetrating observation in his book 
about using game theory in conflicting international relations: “it is the employment 
of threats, or of threats and promises, or more generally of the conditioning of one’s 
own behavior on the behavior of others, that the theory is about.”29  
Game theory can be divided into two categories: zero-sum games and non 
zero-sum games. There is no clear reason to use zero-sum games since this assumes 
the relations of two players are purely conflicting. In reality there exists a complicated 
mix of collaboration and confrontation among the U.S., China and Taiwan. Therefore 
this study will focus on “nonzero-sum games” in the hope of finding a way to 
maximize benefits for both sides of the Taiwan Strait.  
C. BRINKMANSHIP 
                                                 
28 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, March 10, 2006, available at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory/#Mot (last accessed April 2007). 




“At midday, and again in the early evening of October 16, 1962, John F. 
Kennedy called together a group of his closest advisers at the White House. Late the 
night before, the CIA had produced detailed photo intelligence identifying Soviet 
nuclear missile installations under construction on the island of Cuba, some ninety 
miles off the Florida coast; now the President and his men confronted the dangerous 
decision of how the United States should respond.  
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara outlined three possible courses of 
action for the President: “the political course of action” of openly approaching Castro, 
Khrushchev, and U.S. allies in a gambit to resolve the crisis diplomatically, an option 
that McNamara and others considered unlikely to succeed; “a course of action that 
would involve declaration of open surveillance” coupled with “a blockade against 
offensive weapons entering Cuba”; and finally “a military action directed against 
Cuba, starting with an air attack against the missiles. “Much of the conversation that 
day centered on the military option, and the hazardous unknowns of Soviet retaliation 
decisions including the possibility of nuclear escalation.” I don’t believe we have 
considered the consequences,” McNamara told the President. “I don’t know quite 
what kind of a world we live in after we’ve struck Cuba, and we, we’ve started it.... 
How, how do we stop at that point?” Thankfully, the Kennedy administration never 
had to answer that extraordinary question. Ultimately, President Kennedy chose to 
initiate a naval blockade against Soviet ships carrying missile equipment. His strategy 
proved successful; the Soviets withdrew the missiles and nuclear war was averted.”30 
The Art of War by Sun Tzu said: “The ability to subdue the enemy without 
battle is a reflection of the ultimate supreme strategy.”31 This means exploring ways 
so that we do not have to waste unnecessary casualties and can reach a mutually 
agreeable outcome. That is the reason why JFK decided to do whatever he could to 
avoid an invasion of Cuba. Brinkmanship is one of these methods and can be an 
inexpensive, if risky, alternative to fighting actual wars. It is the strategy of pushing a 
dangerous situation to the brink of disaster in order to achieve the most advantageous 
                                                 
30 The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, The 40th Anniversary, The George Washington University, 
2nd Edition, New York: The New Press, 1998, available at: 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/declass.htm (last accessed May 2007). 





outcome. In other words, “The practice, especially in international politics, of seeking 
advantage by creating the impression that one is willing and able to push a highly 
dangerous situation to the limit rather than concede.”32 This concept was first 
introduced during the Cold War to analyze the tense relationship between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union. The most notable example of brinkmanship is the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in 1962 between the Soviet Union and the U.S. which is mentioned 
above. These two superpowers developed highly sophisticated weapons that 
threatened the other side.  
The strategic calculations of both sides did not exclude deadly first strikes to 
paralyze the other side. Therefore, to shorten the warning time and achieve their 
objectives, both sides deployed their nuclear missiles on the closest territory to that of 
the opposing side. In 1961, the U.S. started deploying fifteen Jupiter IRBM 
(intermediate-range ballistic missiles) nuclear missiles in Turkey, which directly 
threatened cities in the western sections of the Soviet Union, including Moscow 
because of its 1500 mile range and its flight time of about sixteen minutes. Later 
Soviet missiles were deployed in Cuba to retaliate, the first time Soviet missiles were 
moved outside the USSR.33 However, both sides clearly understood that the other had 
the ability to undertake a deadly first blow and did not want to bring about a 
destructive nuclear war. Accordingly, they agreed to withdraw their missiles at the 
same time and the crisis ended in a peacefully. The Cuban Missile Crisis especially 
emphasized the danger of nuclear war between the two superpowers. They began to 
consider how to avoid a similar crisis after the Cuban Missile Crisis. For example, 
they set up a “hot line” communication system between Washington DC and Moscow 
to let leaders negotiate to prevent another such crisis from resulting in warfare.   
There are two essential conditions to achieve a credible nuclear deterrent. The 
first one is the possession of nuclear weapons; the second is persuading the other side 
that there are circumstances under which we would use those nuclear weapons. If a 
country only has nuclear weapons and the other side does not believe they have the 
resolve to use nuclear weapons, it is not a credible deterrent. Because the U.S. is a 
                                                 
32 American Heritage Dictionary, 4th Ed. 2000. 
33 Cuban Missile Crisis, Wikipedia, available at: 




democratic country, autocratic countries might not believe the U.S. would really use 
nuclear weapons. The former Soviet Union is an example. Before the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, the former Soviet Union did not think the U.S. was capable of using nuclear 
weapons, until it started the shooting sequences of nuclear bombs. If the U.S. had not 
provided that signal, then the Soviets might have thought the U.S. feared nuclear war 
to such an extent that they could do whatever they liked. Therefore, the application of 
a brinkmanship strategy involves steps that include raising the possibility of a crisis 
and leading the crisis to the edge, hoping to convince the rival to give in. The key to 
brinkmanship is that “threats must be credible.” Meanwhile, if the threat is excessive 
or provides insufficient deterrence, then it may not be credible.34 
In sum, brinkmanship is an artificial creation of the risk of war. However, 
“staking everything on a single throw” can give the enemy incentives to make the 
situation even more dangerous; events can easily get out of control if this policy is not 
used carefully.  
Today China, Taiwan and the U.S. constantly express their opinions on the 
Taiwan Strait issue through public statements to test the policies and wills of the other 
side. If one of the parties were to cross a line that triggered a similar response, 
brinkmanship might apply once again. The U.S. and the PRC who both have nuclear 
arms might use brinkmanship to avert the conflict. This will be an especially 
important topic for this study. Table 5 offers a comparison between the “Cuban 
Missile Crisis” and the “Taiwan Strait Issue.” There are some similarities between 
these two cases. Therefore we can explore the impact of a similar strategy to the one 






                                                 
34 Francois Melese and Diana Angelis, Deterring Terrorists from Using WMD: A Brinkmanship 




Analyses  Cuban Missile Crisis Taiwan Straits Issue 
Geography Cuba is a small and peripheral country of the U.S. 
Taiwan is a small and peripheral 
country of China. 
International 
relations 
The U.S. had more support from 
other countries while Cuba was 
more isolated. 
China has more support from 




The U.S. has its own national 
defense industry. Cuba relied on 
the military aid from the former 
Soviet Union  
China develops its national 
defense industry speedily. 
Taiwan partly relies on arms 
sales from the U.S. 
Leaders’ 
thought 
Although some U.S. high-ranking 
military officers advocated 
attacking Cuba, the government 
used the brinkmanship strategy to 
force the former Soviet Union to 
withdraw the missiles in Cuba.  
Some high-ranking military 
officers advocate attacking 
Taiwan, and the PRC government 
drew up the Anti-Separation Law 
to rationalize the possible attacks 





The former Soviet Union used 
Cuba to check and curb the U.S. 
The U.S. uses Taiwan to check 
and curb China 
Table 5.   Comparisons between “Cuban Missile Crisis” and “Taiwan Straits Issue” 
 
D. STAG HUNT 
In game theory, the “stag hunt” is a type of nonzero-sum game in which two 
players can cooperate with or betray the other player. If both hunters decide to wait 
for stags, they could cooperate to catch the stags. However, if a hare passes by, they 
could give up waiting for stags and chase the hare. Without help from the other one, a 
hunter could get nothing. Therefore, they may both change their mind to chase after 
hares. That is, each hunter must choose an action without knowing the choice of the 
other. In this game, as in all game theory, the only concern of each individual player 
is maximizing his own payoff, without any concern for the other player’s payoff.35 
However, when both players have strong mutual trust, they can create the maximum 
total benefit.  
As in Figure 3, when both hunters have patience to wait for stags, and trust the 
other player will do the same, they will enjoy the maximum payoffs and we assume 
this payoff is 4. However, in this waiting process, if one of them is distracted by a 
                                                 





passing hare, he maybe chooses to chase after this hare for a payoff of 3. In this case, 
the other hunter only gets a payoff of 0, that is, he will end up with nothing. Moreover, 
if both hunters are distracted by a passing hare and give up waiting for stags, they will 
both get the payoffs 3. In this situation, although the payoff is lower if both hunters 
get hares, there is also less risk that they get nothing. Formally, a stag hunt is a game 
with two pure Nash equilibrium.36 Although the payoff superior Nash equilibrium is 
(Stag, Stag), it will be very attractive for both hunters to adopt the risk superior Nash 
equilibrium and give up the stag to chase after hares. In the next section, we adopt the 
Stag Hunt game to explain the tension in the Taiwan Strait. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Payoff Matrix of Stag Hunt Game  
 
                                                 


















A. PAYOFFS OF THE GAME IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT 
1. Payoff Relations in the Taiwan Strait  
Although it seems that the Taiwan Strait is peaceful now, we cannot exclude 
the possibility of a PRC attack. Today China takes the “peace and fight two hand 
strategies” to Taiwan. That is, it negotiates and issues threats at the same time. 
However, extreme Chinese leaders eager for reunification might propose a military 
offensive, that is, to invade Taiwan without any provocation or threatening speech by 
Taiwan. While Taiwan will not attack the mainland, a declaration of independence 
would be a major provocation for China.  
Figure 4 shows the payoffs to both sides of the Taiwan Strait when they take 
the different strategies- To attack (declare independence) or to preserve the peace. 
The column side represents the Chinese choices and the row side represents the 
Taiwanese choices.  
If Taiwan declares its independence and China attacks, the payoffs for Taiwan 
and China is a11 and b11 respectively. If Taiwan declares its independence but China 
still holds the peaceful strategy, Taiwan gets payoff a12 and China gets b12. If China 
attacks while Taiwan keeps peace, the payoff for Taiwan is a21 and China gets b21. If 
China and Taiwan both choose peace, they receive payoffs a22 and b22 respectively. 
From the Taiwanese perspective, if China attacks, Taiwan would rather 
declare its independence seeking international sympathy and support, than to do 
nothing. Therefore a11 will be greater than a21. However, if China holds to the 
peaceful strategy, Taiwan would rather keep peace than declare independence. 
Therefore a22 will be greater than a12. In conclusion, a11＞a21; a22＞a12. 
On the other hand, from a Chinese perspective, if Taiwan announces 
independence first, China prefers to attack in retaliation. Therefore b11 will be greater 
than b12. However, if Taiwan holds to the peaceful strategy, China would rather keep 




Since there are two Nash equilibrium in the matrix of cross-Strait relations 
(Independence, Attack) and (Peace, Peace), this is an example of a stag hunt game.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Payoff Matrix of Cross-Strait Relations  
2. Payoff with Attacking Probabilities Relations in the Taiwan Strait 
Suppose the probability China chooses the aggressive strategy of attacking 
Taiwan is Pf, and that of choosing a peaceful strategy is (1-Pf). Suppose also that the 
probability Taiwan seeks independence is Pi, and that the probability is chooses peace, 
the status quo, is (1-Pi). Now we can generate a new payoff matrix of cross-Strait 
relations as in Figure 5.  
In this matrix, If China starts attack and Taiwan declares independence in 
response, or Taiwan announces independence then China attack in response, the 
payoff of Taiwan and China is A11 and B11 respectively. If Taiwan announces 
independence but China still holds to the peaceful strategy, Taiwan gets payoff A12 
and China gets B12. If China starts attack while Taiwan keeps peace, the payoff of 
Taiwan is A21 and China gets B21. If China and Taiwan can perceive that keeping 
peace is the best strategy for both of them, they will get the payoffs are A22 and B22 
respectively. Combining with the payoffs of cross-Strait relations in Figure 4, we can 
get A11= Pi Pf×a11, A12= Pi(1-Pf)×a12,  A21=(1-Pi)Pf×a21, A22=(1-Pi)(1-Pf)×a22, and 








Note: a11＞a21; a22＞a12 









example, if it is certain that Taiwan will declare independence and China will attack 
then Pi=Pf=1 and A11= a11 and B11= b11 while every other value in the matrix is zero, 
which indicates that this is indeed what is expected to happen (Independence, Attack).  
Now we will investigate the conditions under which both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait believe keeping peace is the best strategy, so no matter what strategy is taken by 
the other side, they will still want to keep peace. In other words, from the Taiwanese 
perspective, A21 will be greater than A11, and A22 will be greater than A12. From the 
Chinese perspective, this requires that B12 will be greater than B11, and that B22 is 
greater than B21.  
Expanding these expressions by the values in Figure 5, we can get the new 
inequalities as follows: 
A21＞A11 
(1-Pi)Pf×a21＞Pi Pf×a11 
a21Pf－(a11+a21) Pi Pf＞0……….(Inequality 1) 
A22＞A12 
(1-Pi)(1-Pf)×a22＞Pi(1- Pf)×a12 
a22－(a12+a22) Pi－a22Pf＋(a12+a22) Pi Pf＞0……….(Inequality 2) 
B12＞B11 
(1-Pf)Pi×b12＞Pi Pf×b11 
b12Pi－(b11+b12) Pi Pf＞0……….(Inequality 3) 
B22＞B21 
(1-Pi)(1-Pf)×b22＞Pf(1- Pi)×b21 





For these inequalities to hold both sides of the Taiwan Strait must perceive 
keeping peace is the best strategy for cross-Strait relations, that is, both the 
probabilities Pi and Pf are very small, and both the payoffs a22 and b22 are relatively 
large. In inequality 1, because the value of Pi ×Pf is close to zero, so the value of 
(a11+a21)×Pi Pf is very slim too. Therefore it is reasonable to suppose that a21Pf will be 
greater than (a11+a21)×Pi Pf. The similar inference is in inequality 3. In inequality 2, 
because the payoff a22 is relatively large but both Pi and Pf are slim, it is reasonable to 
assume that [a22－(a12+a22) Pi－a22Pf＋(a12+a22) Pi Pf] is still greater than zero. The 
similar inference is in inequality 4.   
Under these conditions, there is a dominant-strategy solution with the outcome 
(A22, B22). That is, both sides of Taiwan Strait would try their best to keep peace. In 
this condition, cooperation is the best way for both sides. In this case, the cross-Strait 
relations are like a reverse Prisoner’s Dilemma.37 The challenge is to ensure that in 
reality these conditions are met. 
                                                 
37 Prisoner’s Dilemma, Wikipedia, available at: 





Figure 5.   Payoff Matrix Combined with Attacking Probabilities in Cross-Strait 
Relations 
3. An Extensive Form Approach to Potential Payoffs in the Taiwan 
Strait 
To conform to the expressions: a11＞a21; a22＞a12 and b11＞b12; b22＞b21 in 
Figure 4, we assume the payoff matrix of cross-Strait relations as Figure 6.38  
Given the assumed values in Figure 6, the tree structure in Figure 7 represents 
expected payoffs. Column 1 represents the original payoffs for Taiwan and China. 
According to the expressions in Figure 5, if both the probabilities are 0.2 for China 
and Taiwan to declare its independence, we will get the payoff as Column 2. With the 
probabilities of attack and independence for both sides equal to 0.8, the payoffs will 
be given by Column 3. 
                                                 








Note: A11= Pi Pf×a11 
 A12= Pi(1-Pf)×a12 
 A21= (1-Pi)Pf×a21 
    A22= (1-Pi)(1-Pf)×a22 
B11= Pf Pi×b11 
  B12= (1-Pf)Pi×b12 
  B21= Pf(1-Pi)×b21  










Compared to payoffs when both sides take peaceful strategies, payoffs in 
Column 3 (which are 0.04) are much smaller than those in Column 2 (which are 0.64). 
This is because both sides raise the probability of attack in Column 3 and makes the 
hope for peace lower. When the probability of keeping peace is higher, the payoff of 
keeping peace is higher too. Column 4 is the most ideal condition for cross- Strait 
relations. When both sides have zero for their independence or attack probability 
respectively and indeed keep their peaceful strategies, they will both get a maximum 
payoff. Any action to break peace will lower their payoffs to zero for both sides. 
Therefore, no matter from the perspective of Taiwan or China, keeping a high 
probability of peaceful strategies is the best guarantee for getting a high payoff. 
 
 


















    Original payoffs  When Pi=.02; Pf=0.2  When Pi=0.8; Pf=0.8  When Pi=0; Pf=0
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Figure 7.   Assumed Payoff Combined with Attacking Probabilities in 
Cross-Strait Relations  
 
B. THE PROBABILITY OF U.S. INTERVENTION 
There are two different policies currently discussed by the United States with 
respect to the Taiwan Strait issue: “strategic transparency” and “strategic ambiguity.” 
In “strategic transparency,” the U.S. clarifies when it would intervene in a Taiwan 
Strait conflict. That is, if China attacks Taiwan, the U.S. would come to its defense. 
However, were Taiwan to attack first (i.e. declare its independence), the U.S. would 
refrain from intervention. Following this policy, the U.S. position would involve 
explicit communication with China and Taiwan and U.S. intervention in a Taiwan 
Strait conflict would be predictable.  
However, in the alternative case of “strategic ambiguity,” the U.S. policy 
would be to maintain an enigmatic posture, which leaves both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait uncertain about U.S. actions. In this case, the likelihood of a U.S. intervention is 
hard to assess. We take an example from Schelling’s book: “if my neighbor’s fruit 
tree overhangs my yard and I pick exactly all the fruit on my side of the line, my 
neighbor can probably discern what my proposal is, and has a good idea of what he 




same amount of fruit from both sides of the line haphazardly or pick some amount 
that is related, say, to the size of my family, he is less likely to perceive just what I 
have in mind. (He may also be more obliged to resist or retaliate if I pick only part of 
the fruit on my side of the line than if I pick it all, since I have failed to demarcate the 
limit of my intentions.)”39  
In this example, picking only part of the fruit on my side of the line is more 
likely to cause retaliation from the neighbor than that if I picked it all. Why? An 
uncertain approach may turn out to be more harmful than a clear stand. What the U.S. 
wants is to deter rash actions through ambiguous strategies to keep the balance 
between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Although this strategy could be more 
politically acceptable to the U.S., it might also lead to difficulties if military hostilities 
break out in the Taiwan Strait. 
Both threats and promises are interwoven between the U.S., China, and 
Taiwan regarding the Taiwan Strait issue. For the PRC, the Taiwan Relations Act is a 
threat but it is also a promise because it offers only defensive weapons to Taiwan. In 
1991, U.S. General Colin Powell proposed the noted “Powell Doctrine,” including 
eight questions that should be answered before the U.S. takes military action: 
1.  Is a vital national security interest threatened?  
2.  Do we have a clear attainable objective?  
3.  Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?  
4.  Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?  
5.  Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?  
6.  Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?  
7.  Is the action supported by the American people?  
8.  Do we have genuine broad international support?40 
The Powell doctrine could provide a framework for U.S. military action in the 
Taiwan Strait. Both China and Taiwan could interpret both a promise and a threat 
although they cannot determine the exact probability of U.S. intervention. That is, if  
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both sides of the Taiwan Strait do not cross the “line,” the U.S. will not intervene in 
the Taiwan Strait. However, once one side precipitates hostilities, the U.S. could 
intervene in this conflict.  
C. THE SCENARIO IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT 
Applying a game tree to analyze the Taiwan Strait issue, the first level is 
decided by Taiwan, which has two choices-- keeping the status quo or announcing 
independence. The second level is decided by the PRC, which has two choices-- 
keeping the status quo or attacking Taiwan. The third level is decided by the U.S., 
which also has two choices-- intervening or staying out of the Taiwan Strait conflict.  
Assume that if Taiwan maintains the status quo and the PRC attacks Taiwan, 
the probability of U.S. intervention is P. Alternatively, assume that if Taiwan 
announces independence and the PRC attacks Taiwan, the probability of U.S. 
intervention is Q. The probability P is assumed greater than Q because when Taiwan 
maintains the status quo and China attacks, the U.S. has a more reasonable motive for 
intervening. 
Based on the 80/20 Rule,41 when the U.S. adopts “strategic ambiguity,” we 
assume P is equal to 0.8 and Q is equal to 0.2. However, if the U.S. selects “strategic 
transparency,” the probability we assume P will equal to 1 and Q will equal to 0.  
Based on the 80/20 Rule again and the military power comparison that the U.S. 
is greater than China and China is greater than Taiwan, we assume the probability of 
the PRC success when it attacks Taiwan without the U.S. intervention is 0.8. On the 
contrary, the probability of the PRC successful attack when the U.S. intervene the 
Taiwan Strait issue is 0.2 because the probability of the U.S. success in intervening is 
0.8. Therefore, Figure 8 is the scenario in the Taiwan Strait issue in extensive form 
when the U.S. adopts “strategic transparency”; Figure 9 illustrates the case of 
“strategic ambiguity.” 
                                                 
41 Pareto's Principle－the 80/20 Rule, which means that in anything a few (20 percent) are vital 
and many (80 percent) are trivial, available at: 
























Prob(PRC success) = .80
P=1; Q=0
 
Figure 8.   Scenario in the Taiwan Strait in extensive form when the U.S. has 






















Prob(PRC success) = .80
1≧ P>Q≧ 0
 
Figure 9.   Scenario in the Taiwan Strait in extensive form when the U.S. has 





In Figure 8, when the U.S. has a “strategic transparency” policy, there is only 
one scenario that results in U.S. intervention, that is, Taiwan maintains the status quo 
and the PRC attacks. In this case, the probability of the PRC’s success for attacking 
Taiwan with the U.S. intervention is 0.2.  
Alternatively, in Figure 9, when the U.S. has a “strategic ambiguity” policy, 
there are two scenarios that could result in U.S. intervention: Taiwan maintains the 
status quo and the PRC attacks or Taiwan announces its independence and the PRC 
attacks . The probability of the first scenario is 0.16 (0.8 multiplied by 0.2); the 
probability of the second scenario is 0.04 (0.2 multiplied by 0.2). Therefore, the total 
probability of the PRC’s success for attacking Taiwan with the U.S. intervention is 
also 0.2 in this condition when the U.S. takes “strategic ambiguity.” Therefore, the 
probability the PRC obtains its payoff for attacking Taiwan when the U.S. intervenes 
is assumed constant at 0.2. 
Suppose there is a fifty-fifty chance the U.S. chooses “strategic transparency” 
or “strategic ambiguity.” Accordingly, as the probabilities of the U.S. intervention in 
Figure8 and Figure 9, we can get the probability [(0.5×1) ＋ (0.5×0.8) = 0.9]. 
Therefore, the most likely situation which would result in a conflict between the U.S. 
and the PRC is where Taiwan maintains the status quo but the PRC attacks Taiwan.  
In conclusion, if both sides of the Taiwan Strait can maintain the status quo, 
the probability of conflict between the U.S. and the PRC will be greatly reduced. To 
prevent conflict and maintain the status quo is one of the great policy concerns of the 
U.S.  
D. BRINKMANSHIP IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT 
Brinkmanship is one strategy designed to achieve political objectives while 
risking, but not causing active hostilities. Now we will extend the previous discussion 
to examine the situation when the U.S. intervenes in the Taiwan Strait. In Figure 10, 
after the U.S. intervention, the PRC can either withdraw or confront the U.S. If the 
PRC prefers to withdraw, Taiwan can declare its independence or maintain the status 
quo. On the other hand, if the PRC chooses to confront the U.S., the U.S. could 




could be taken by force and the U.S. could lose its position in the Taiwan Strait. If 
there is a U.S.-PRC confrontation, there could be two possible results. The first is that 
war breaks out right away; the second is that both use brinkmanship strategies to 
persuade or threaten the other side to back down.  
Figure 11 shows the most likely outcome in the Taiwan Strait issue after the 
U.S. intervention. Suppose there are four attitudes to the Taiwan Strait issue for the 
U.S. and the PRC: peaceful, patient, impatient, and aggressive.42 That is, if the dovish 
sentiment is dominant, they will prefer the peaceful strategy, but if the hawks prevail, 
they will tend towards more aggressive strategies.  
The numbers in the table reveal the most likely results for Figure 10. If at least 
one side chooses a peaceful strategy, the result would be peaceful because one party 
withdraws first. If both sides are patient, or one is patient but the other one is 
impatient, they may still have a chance at a peaceful result using brinkmanship 
strategy. However, if both sides are impatient, or one side is patient but the other side 
is aggressive, there could be a war as a result of the application of a brinkmanship 
strategy. At last, if both sides are aggressive, or one is impatient but the other one is 
aggressive, there could be a war without any possibility of negotiations. 
PRC Withdraws  
1 (Peace)  






US Intervenes  
  
  Succeed 3 (Peace)
Brinkmanship
  








Figure 10.   Scenario in the Taiwan Strait in extensive form after the U.S. 
intervention 
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PRC\US Peaceful Patient Impatient Aggressive 
Peaceful 1 1 1 1 
Patient 2 3 3 4 
Impatient 2 3 4 5 
Aggressive 2 4 5 5 
Figure 11.   The most likely outcomes in the Taiwan Strait issue after the U.S. 
intervention (The numbers are related to those in Figure 9) 
 
The successful key to brinkmanship is that both sides are patient. Through 
constant persuasion and threat, both sides can find a way to negotiate a peaceful end. 
That is, although keeping an intense confrontation is important when using 
brinkmanship, it is more important for both sides to have the patience to negotiate. 
Even though while one side is more impatient, the other side may still likely attempt 
to persuade it from a destructive conflict by taking the patient attitude. However, if 
both sides are impatient to use brinkmanship, it could fail and result in a nuclear war. 
A worse case is if one side is patient but the other side is aggressive, the aggressive 
side might start a nuclear attack out of miscalculation. Therefore, although outcomes 
“4” and “5” both lead to war, outcome “4” would be more dangerous than “5.” 
Outcome “5” would likely result in a conventional war right away due to the 
aggressive attitudes of both sides. However, outcome “4” could bring about a nuclear 
war after failed brinkmanship. Therefore, brinkmanship should be applied based on 
the attitude of the other side. When the U.S. confronts Chinese brinkmanship in the 
Taiwan Strait conflict, it can not show a weak attitude. Especially when China is very 
aggressive and the U.S. cannot raise the tension, there could be reason for China 
believing threats based on the assumption that nuclear forces can resolve everything. 
Like the former Soviet Union leaders before the Cuban Missile Crisis, China 
today apparently thinks the U.S. people want comfort and peace and will never use 








Therefore, China has consistently proclaimed a “no first use” nuclear doctrine.43 
However, in recent years with the development of ballistic missiles and nuclear 
technology, the PRC’s nuclear policy has changed. Some Chinese generals threaten 
the U.S. with nuclear forces publicly, especially over the Taiwan Strait issue. For 
example, People’s Liberation Army General Zhu Chenghu once said: “We will 
prepare ourselves for the destruction of all the cities east of the Xian. Of course, the 
Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds of cities will be destroyed by the 
Chinese.”44 In other words, they think they can achieve strategic objectives through 
nuclear forces and do not take the risk seriously.  
There are some reasons for China to use nuclear threats because their nuclear 
forces have developed very quickly. However, the U.S. nuclear threat to China has 
not changed in response. By experience in the Cuban Missile Crisis, we know verbal 
threats are not completely useful. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, language had been very 
serious, but the former Soviet Union did not believe it until the U.S. started the 
generation sequences of nuclear forces. Therefore, only by pushing the situation to a 
dangerous brink, would the U.S. make China really understand it will not shrink back 
because of the possibility of nuclear war. Only when China believes this, can the U.S. 
establish a mutual nuclear threat relationship with China with both sides striving to 
avoid using their nuclear forces. The Cuban Missile Crisis established the mutual 
nuclear threat foundation between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union.45 This crisis 
confirmed the principle that they could not use nuclear forces in their future conflicts. 
The security the U.S. enjoys now is not only based on nuclear technology, but also by 
demonstrating that determination to resolve the crisis. The greatest danger at present 
is that the U.S. and China have not yet confirmed the principle that nuclear forces 
cannot be used in solving their conflicts, including the Taiwan Strait issue. At present, 
some Chinese generals are addicted to the prospect of using nuclear forces to resolve  
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the Taiwan Strait issue and some other issues with the U.S. Therefore, the solution is 
not the U.S. nuclear technology or the National Missile Defense (NMD) program, but 
on showing willingness to use the nuclear forces if necessary.  
E.  STAG HUNT GAME IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT 
The relationship of Taiwan and China today is captured well in the stag hunt 
game. Taiwan wants to be an independent country some day, but China hopes to 
reunify with Taiwan. These interests are like two parallel lines with no convergence. 
The assumed payoff matrix for the stag hunt game between Taiwan and China is 
pictured in Figure 12. The first number in each block is the payoff of Taiwan and the 
second one is the payoff of China. If both sides pursue peace (e.g., maintaining the 
status quo or reaching a peaceful agreement), they will both get the maximum payoffs. 
However, if one of them defects the opposite side (e.g., Taiwan announces 
independence or China attacks), the peaceful side will get the minimum payoff. This 
model is not totally the same as Figure 3 in Chapter III because when both sides 
decide to give up their peaceful strategies, they will not get a payoff as good as when 
the other decides to continue a peaceful strategy. However, both they may take action 
to raise their payoffs. For example, if China attacks, Taiwan could be forced to decide 
independence to seek the international sympathy and support. However, as hunters 
(metaphorically) in this situation, cooperation will result in a win-win situation, but 
defection will result in worse outcomes for both. 
 















For avoiding the condition where both sides of the Taiwan Strait end in 
common ruin because no one wants to get the less payoff, a binding agreement would 
be an efficient solution. Therefore, Taiwan and China would do better to cooperate or 
conclude agreements to solve cross-Strait differences. For instance, they can acquire 
trust from the other side via the establishment of military confidence-building 
measures, the economic integration of bilateral trade relations, cultivating 
non-governmental communication, etc. Only through effective communication and 
cooperation can China and Taiwan both succeed in escaping their current predicament 
in the Taiwan Strait conflict.  
F. FUTURE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT ISSUE 
1. Taiwan Presidential Election in 2008 
The election for the 12th Taiwanese President and vice-President will be held 
in March 2008. In Taiwan there are two main political parties: the KMT 
(Kuomintang) and the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party). Each party will nominate 
candidates for both offices. Basically, the KMT supports dialogue with the 
Communist Party of China under the “1992 Consensus,” which states that both China 
and Taiwan belong to one China with both sides having different interpretations of 
that term.46 The DPP, on the contrary, opposes recognizing “One China“ and leans 
towards independence.47 Therefore, the KMT is considered moderate, while the DPP 
is deemed radical regarding Taiwan’s relationship with China. The DPP had won the 
2000 and 2004 Taiwanese Presidential elections. However, according to a survey by 
the Taiwan United News in January 2007, the likely KMT candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, 
will defeat the likely DPP candidates, Frank Hsieh.48 The outcome of this election 
will have considerable effect upon cross-Strait relations. The first impact may be on 
the U.S. 10 billion dollar arms sale. The DPP agrees with the arms sale while the 
KMT opposed it. The second impact involves whether the “three links” strategy will 
be executed or not. (“Three links” means direct postal, direct transportation, and 
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direct trade links between mainland China and Taiwan.) The KMT supports 
immediately opening up these links with China, while the DPP opposes direct links.49 
The other important impact of the election will be on the defensive referendum. Some 
DPP supporters take it as a strategy of brinkmanship in response to the PRC’s 
“Anti-Separation Law” and more than 700 ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. 
However, some KMT supporters think this referendum is a provocation and oppose 
it.50  
2. Democratization in China 
After the major economic reforms that have taken place in China, there are 
two U.S. opinions on China’s rise to become a global power. The first one is that it 
will have a great impact on U.S. economic interests in Asia. This opinion is based on 
the zero-sum game theory. The second is that China’s peaceful rise is not a zero-sum 
game but creates a lot of commercial opportunities for global companies, including 
those in the U.S.51  However the gap between economic development and the 
autocratic political system is still significant.52 Based on the relationship between the 
U.S. and the former Soviet Union, we know that democratization in an autocratic 
country tends to decrease hostility with democratic states. One of the most noted 
examples is the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which was signed 
in1987, the year the USSR started its economic reforms.53 It was an agreement 
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ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 
kilometers. 54   Therefore, if China is willing to give up the Communist Party 
autocracy and start to democratize, we can expect the relationship among China, 
Taiwan, and the U.S. will greatly improve. 
3. The U.S. Presidential Election in 2008  
The U.S. will hold its 55th consecutive quadrennial election for President and 
vice President of the U.S. in November 2008.55 Although there are many potential 
candidates, the delegates from either Democratic Party or Republican Party will still 
win this election ultimately. No matter which party wins this election, the outcome 
will significantly affect the relationship among China, Taiwan, and the U.S.. Ronald 
Reagan was believed the most supportive U.S. President to Taiwan.56 In 1982, 
Reagan signed the “August 17 Joint Communiqué” with China to reduce arms sales to 
Taiwan. However, he also issued “Six Assurances” to Taiwan, including that the U.S. 
would not agree to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan nor to consult with 
China on arms sales to Taiwan. It also included the assurance that the U.S. would not 
revise the Taiwan Relations Act.57 Moreover, the current U.S. President, George 
Walker Bush, approved a 10 billion dollar arms sale to Taiwan, although it is still 
vetoed by the Taiwanese opposition party today. However, the former U.S. President 
Bill Clinton issued the “Three No’s” principles on Taiwan. In 1998, Clinton said: “I 
had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy which is that we don’t support 
independence for Taiwan, or ‘two Chinas,’ or ‘one Taiwan, one China,’ and we don’t 
believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a  
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requirement.”58 From these policies the Republican Party seems friendlier to Taiwan. 
However, U.S. strategies are mainly driven by U.S. interests, so it is hard to judge the 
effect on China and Taiwan policies by which party wins the 2008 election.  
G.   BRINKMANSHIP OR STAG HUNT IN THE FUTURE 
Because the Communist Party still controls economy and politics in China, 
there is no indication that they would move to democratization in the near future.59 
On the other hand, the U.S. strategy on the Taiwan Strait is not decided merely by 
which party wins the Presidential election in 2008. Therefore, we consider primarily 
the effect of the 2008 Taiwan Presidential election on the Taiwan Strait issue here. 
Basically, the “three links” is taken as a policy of symbolic cooperation for 
both the PRC and Taiwan. Therefore, this policy could lead the cross-Strait relations 
from confrontation to cooperation (like the stag hunt game). On the other hand, the 10 
billion dollar arms sale and the defensive referendum are deemed strategies for raising 
tension. They might lead to brinkmanship strategies in cross-Strait relations. Figure 
13 examines the Taiwan Strait issue in extensive form based on different strategies of 
Taiwan. If Taiwan prefers cooperation to hostility; that is, Taiwan opens up “three 
links” but declines arms sales from the U.S., the probability of Chinese invasion could 
be less than that of using a confronting strategy. However, “three links” could bring 
some national security problems, and an arms sales veto could cause the U.S. to have 
no desire to defend Taiwan.60 Therefore, if China decides to attack Taiwan, the 
probability of the PRC’s success for the war when Taiwan adopts a confronting 
strategy would be less.  
In Figure 13, if the KMT wins the 2008 Presidential election, and the 
Taiwanese select the “three links” strategy, the probability of PRC attack is P, and the 
probability that the PRC wins this war is R. On the other hand, when the DPP wins 
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the 2008 Presidential election, that is, Taiwan chooses a more aggressive strategy, the 
probability of a PRC attack is Q, and the probability that the PRC wins is S. Therefore, 
the probability of forced reunification when Taiwan takes the more moderate “three 
links” strategy is (P × R); the probability of forced reunification when Taiwan takes 
the more radical “arms sale” strategy is (Q × S). As shown above, 1>Q>P>0 and 
1>R>S>0, so we are unsure which value is bigger between (P × R) and (Q × S). This 
explains why these topics are always major political issues in Taiwan.  
There are two ways to decrease the probability of forced reunification: 
decreasing (P × R) or (Q×S). For the KMT, if they place more emphasis on 
Taiwanese national defense, P is maybe increased a little while R will likely decrease 
a lot. Similarly for the DDP, if they communicate more friendly intentions to China, S 
is maybe increased a little while Q would likely decrease a lot. That is, if the KMT 
and DDP can lean toward the strategies of the other party a bit, they can reach an 
identical objective. Therefore, it should be feasible to complete the three links and 
arms sales at the same time. However, due to the seriously different opinions between 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
We live in a globalized and interdependent world; what happens in any given 
region can significantly impact the whole world. The Taiwan Strait issue is one of the 
most important issues in the world today. If China engages in an unprovoked attack of 
Taiwan, the probability of U.S. intervention is relatively high. Since the U.S. and 
China are both nuclear powers, this could threaten nuclear war. The U.S. had 
successfully stopped the Cuban Missile Crisis by threatening to use its nuclear arms in 
a brinkmanship strategy in 1962. This success also inspired many countries, including 
China, to develop nuclear arms. Since the first atomic bomb was dropped on 
Hiroshima over 60 years ago, humans have avoided nuclear war. The Taiwan Strait 
issue offers another test of our resolve to avoid nuclear confrontation. 
In the Taiwan Strait, the most likely excuse for China to attempt a military 
conquest is for Taiwan to unilaterally declare its independence. However, 
independence has become a tool for Taiwanese politicians’ to manipulate public 
opinion. But in manipulating the Taiwanese sentiments they also risk the security of 
the region and the world. The U.S. and its allies are unlikely to dispatch troops to 
defend Taiwan unless China attacks Taiwan without provocation. If the U.S. and its 
allies intervene in this conflict, they could soon withdraw if China raises a nuclear 
threat. However, such a confrontation could make China a more aggressive power in 
the region. For this reason, the U.S. might apply a brinkmanship strategy to cope with 
the Chinese nuclear threat much as it did in the Cuban Missile Crisis. If the U.S. 
succeeds, China will likely back down or withdraw; but this would also risk a 
destructive nuclear war. 
The lesson of this study is that it is critical for both the leaders of the U.S. and 
China to deal with this potential crisis. Hopefully, brinkmanship is a last resort in the 
game among the U.S., China and Taiwan, and nuclear power will not be used in 
resolving the Taiwan Strait issue. Accordingly, all three parties would do well to 
commit to patiently maintaining the status quo. Even better, all three parties could 
sign an agreement that commits all parties to maintain the status quo for an extended 
period. The recommendations from this study are as follows: First, that it would be 




quo, like holding an independence referendum. Second, if Taiwan promises not to 
declare its independence, China should withdraw or at least reduce the missiles which 
target Taiwan, and renounce the use of military force to achieve reunification. Third, 
the U.S. should make clear that it will not support Taiwanese independence and will 
only intervene if China attacks Taiwan without any provocation. That is, the U.S. 
would do better to practice “strategic transparency,” not “strategic ambiguity.” 
To avoid Chinese leaders starting a war, Taiwan and the U.S. should do the 
following. First, Taiwan should develop and intensify its national defense, at least to 
have its own capability for resisting a Chinese attack before the arrival of the U.S. 
assistance. Second, the U.S. could signal its willingness to risk nuclear weapons use 
to cope with an unprovoked attack from China. Although brinkmanship is a last resort 
in the Taiwan Strait issue, under certain dire circumstances it may be the only way to 
avoid a highly destructive war. Third, Taiwan and the U.S. should help foster 
democratization in China. Finally, Taiwan should pursue improved relations with 
China through initiatives such as “three links,” the economic integration of bilateral 
trade relations, cultivating non-governmental communication, etc. 
Ideally, instead of confrontation, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should 
cooperate. It is likely that the Taiwanese would want to reunify or form a 
confederation someday if the advantages of reunification are greater than the 
disadvantages. China should keep developing its economy and preparing for 
democratization to improve relations with Taiwan. Moreover, Taiwan should adopt 
more open approaches to China. For example, open more Taiwanese commerce to 
China and encourage more Chinese tourism in Taiwan. This could promote 
communication between both peoples and encourage the mainland Chinese to 
gradually pursue more liberal policies in the region.     
In conclusion, the challenge is to turn the Taiwan Strait issue from a zero-sum 
or negative-sum game to a positive sum, win-win situation for the U.S., China, and 
Taiwan. The hope is that the Taiwan Strait issue can be resolved peacefully over time. 
As commercial relations expand and the military threat to Taiwan retreats, China 






people would no longer live under the threat of war, natural reunification would occur 
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